Western Balkan Carbon Pricing Decisions Could Shift Revenue and CBAM Costs

By J.L.
7 Min Read

The introduction of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is putting domestic carbon-pricing policy at the centre of economic decisions across the Western Balkans. Governments exporting electricity, metals and cement to the bloc must consider whether to collect carbon revenues through national systems or leave a greater share of the effective carbon cost to be borne by EU importers.

The issue is particularly significant for economies that continue to depend on coal-fired electricity generation and carbon-intensive industrial facilities. Domestic pricing systems could generate revenue for decarbonisation while providing evidence of carbon costs paid that may be recognised under EU CBAM. However, the value of that recognition depends on how each national system is designed and implemented.

Serbia introduced a greenhouse-gas emissions tax of EUR 4 per tonne of CO₂ equivalent in January 2026. It covers specified industrial sectors and electricity generation, with the taxable emissions base calculated after deductions for reference emissions.

Montenegro already operates an emissions trading framework and revised its rules in 2026. Its electricity utility has indicated substantially higher expected payments associated with coal-related emissions. Bosnia and Herzegovina, meanwhile, faces significant CBAM exposure but has a more fragmented system of carbon pricing and electricity governance.

Domestic carbon charges and EU CBAM recognition

National carbon taxes and emissions trading systems do not automatically provide exporters with an equivalent reduction in EU CBAM liabilities. Recognition depends on which emissions are covered, whether a carbon price was actually paid, what relief or allocation arrangements apply, how payments are verified and whether they meet the EU’s legal requirements for recognising foreign carbon prices.

A statutory tax rate alone does not establish the amount that exporters can claim as an eligible carbon payment. If a government announces a charge but collects only limited revenue from a particular installation, the effective credit available to its exporters may be considerably smaller than the headline rate suggests.

By contrast, a system that records payments clearly and provides reliable verification can make domestic carbon pricing more relevant to companies competing in the European market. Exporters need evidence of the effective costs incurred, rather than simply confirmation that a national tax or ETS exists.

Revenue allocation and the cost of industrial decarbonisation

The introduction of a meaningful domestic carbon price can increase operating costs for coal-fired power plants and energy-intensive manufacturers before revenue from the system has been converted into cleaner infrastructure. This creates difficult decisions for governments where exposed companies include major employers and strategically important utilities.

Authorities must determine how to use carbon revenues to support electricity grid upgrades, energy efficiency, industrial process improvements and worker transition, while retaining incentives for emissions reductions.

The distribution and timing of that spending are also important. Ring-fencing proceeds for electricity networks, industrial efficiency measures or worker retraining could improve public acceptance. Investors, however, need transparent project-selection procedures and clear delivery milestones to assess whether revenues are being converted into practical emissions-reduction measures.

The financial position of different industrial operators may also vary. A coal-fired utility responsible for carbon payments could continue to require public-service obligations and liquidity support, while a privately owned steelworks may not have access to comparable compensation.

Governments therefore face pressure to publish more than the statutory carbon rate. Relevant information includes the emissions covered, applicable allowances or reference values, actual revenue collected and the projects financed through the proceeds.

Such disclosures would help establish whether domestic carbon pricing is changing production decisions or mainly redistributing costs among companies, consumers and public budgets. They would also provide exporters with supporting evidence when demonstrating carbon prices effectively paid to EU importers.

Electricity market integration and regional differences

Different national approaches could complicate the integration of Western Balkan electricity markets with the EU. Countries seeking closer participation in the European electricity market may continue to operate with different emissions prices, electricity default factors and compliance arrangements, even as cross-border interconnections allow electricity to move between them.

In October, the Energy Community warned that CBAM should not discourage renewable energy investment or divide electricity markets along the EU’s borders.

Electricity market coupling and equivalence between carbon-pricing systems are connected policy objectives, but progress in one area does not automatically deliver the other. Any applicable derogations or recognition arrangements must satisfy defined legal conditions.

These differences are particularly relevant for electricity exporters, whose exposure to CBAM depends on the applicable emissions treatment and the regulatory arrangements governing cross-border power trade.

Bosnia and Herzegovina faces measurable economic exposure

The potential macroeconomic effects are illustrated by the International Monetary Fund’s 2026 assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The IMF estimates that CBAM currently concerns approximately 11% of the country’s exports.

In a scenario without offsetting domestic measures, the mechanism could reduce real GDP by between 0.4% and 0.7% by 2035. This is a scenario rather than a forecast of inevitable losses, but it demonstrates how carbon-border costs could affect national economic output and public finances beyond individual export contracts.

For governments across the region, the central policy challenge extends beyond deciding whether to introduce a domestic tax or emissions trading system. Effective national arrangements require credible emissions inventories, transparent collection and accounting of revenues, investment in measures that lower carbon intensity, and documentation that allows companies to demonstrate eligible payments to EU importers.

Without those elements, announcing a domestic carbon price may have limited consequences for the actual carbon cost attached to a tonne of electricity, metal or cement exported to the European market.

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